In Re Term of Parental Rights as to I.C. and L.R

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS AS TO I.C. and L.R.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0027
FILED 09-30-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD34854
The Honorable Suzanne E. Cohen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant Madalyn C.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer L. Thorson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Law Office of Joseph Ramiro-Shanahan PLLC, Scottsdale
By Jessica E. Strain
Counsel for Appellee Child I.C.

John L. Popilek PC, Scottsdale
By John L. Popilek
Counsel for Appellant Antonio R.
Joshua Fry Law, Phoenix
By Joshua Fry
Counsel for Appellee Child L.R.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Madalyn C. (“Mother”) and Antonio R. (“L.R.’s Father”)
appeal the juvenile court’s ruling terminating their parental rights. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. I.C. Is Found Dependent but Later Returned to Mother.

¶2 I.C. was born in 2016. I.C. was found dependent as to Mother
because of inappropriate care and supervision, and as to his father, a
nonparty to this case, for neglect and abandonment, in 2017. After Mother
met the juvenile court’s requirements, Mother moved for I.C. to be returned
to her physical custody. The court granted the motion returning I.C. to
Mother’s care. In 2018, the juvenile court dismissed the dependency action.

B. I.C. Is Found Dependent as to Mother and L.R. Is Found
Dependent as to Mother and L.R.’s Father.

¶3 In September 2022, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”)
received a report of “a strong smell of fentanyl coming from [Mother] and
[L.R.’s Father’s] apartment.” During a search of the apartment, L.R.’s
Father “was observed throwing burnt foil in the trash.” A “grinder and a
wax pen” were found in Mother’s purse. Father admitted to smoking
“Perks.”

¶4 In November, DCS received another report that Mother tested
positive for fentanyl three days after giving birth to L.R. She admitted using
marijuana and fentanyl while pregnant. Mother reported she last used
fentanyl a week before L.R.’s birth. A month later, DCS petitioned for
dependency for I.C., as to Mother, and L.R., as to Mother and L.R.’s Father.
The court found both children dependent.

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C. I.C. and L.R.’s Attorneys Move to Sever Mother and L.R.’s
Father’s Parental Rights. A Termination Adjudication
Hearing Is Held.

¶5 In August 2024, counsel for the children moved to terminate
Mother and L.R.’s Father’s parental rights. They cited: (1) chronic
substance abuse, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3); (2) out-of-home placement for a total
of more than nine months and the parents have “substantially neglected or
willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in
an out-of-home placement,” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a); and (3) out-of-home
placement for a total of more than fifteen months, the parents have not
remedied the cause of the placement, and there is a substantial likelihood
that the parents will “not be capable of exercising proper and effective
parental care and control in the near future,” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The
court held a termination adjudication hearing on February 24, 2025.

1. Mother Testifies

¶6 Mother testified about her drug use. She began using drugs
when she was about 13 or 14 years old and is now 25. Mother “started using
fentanyl in 2020” after being clean from heroin for the previous six years.
She admitted buying pills just before L.R.’s birth, using fentanyl while
pregnant, and that L.R. was a substance-exposed newborn. Mother stated
L.R. was transferred to Hushabye Nursery shortly after birth because L.R.
was experiencing withdrawal symptoms. For a time, Mother used three to
four fentanyl pills per day. She admitted police found drug paraphernalia
in her car in January 2024. Mother continued to use marijuana.

¶7 Mother also testified about her experiences with services DCS
offered. She missed several months of testing since November 2022 but
tested positive for fentanyl 30 times. Mother knew she tested positive for
fentanyl 11 times between September 2024 and January 2025, but contended
she stopped using fentanyl on November 1, 2024; she believes the tests were
tampered with or false positives. DCS also offered her services through
Terros and the Nurturing Parenting Program (NPP), both of which were
closed out for lack of participation. Mother contended her employment
interfered with her ability to participate. Mother also received services
through Hushabye, which were closed for lack of engagement but reopened
in January 2025. Mother was enrolled in a program which provides her
with methadone treatment, and had been improving.

¶8 Mother also testified about her relationship with her children.
She testified she “would like” more time “to be able to demonstrate [her]

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sobriety.” Mother testified she had regular visitation with her children but
that intensive care sometimes declines visitation. L.R. has been in foster
care her entire life, so Mother has never parented her outside her visits.
Mother explained I.C. has been in DCS’ custody for almost three-and-a-half
years—nearly half his life. Mother felt she would be able to maintain
sobriety and understood what she needed to do as a parent.

2. L.R.’s Father Testifies

¶9 L.R.’s Father testified that, like Mother, he began using
fentanyl during COVID. He had used heroin and methamphetamines from
the age of 15. He was regularly using fentanyl when DCS began its
investigation. L.R.’s Father recalled I.C. had caught him doing fentanyl at
least once. L.R.’s Father was offered drug testing and missed over 80 tests
before starting to test in March 2024. From March 2024 to the hearing date,
L.R.’s Father tested positive for fentanyl more than 20 times, his most recent
being only a month before the hearing. Like Mother, L.R.’s Father contests
the results, contending he has been sober since November 1, 2024.

¶10 He also testified about the services in which he engaged and
his relationship with L.R. L.R.’s Father was referred to Terros but was
closed out in January 2025 for lack of engagement. He also attended
programming at Hushabye Nursery. Similarly, he engaged in NPP and
engaged in supervised parenting time. He stated he “want[s] to be there
for [L.R.]” L.R.’s Father testified he felt bonded to both children and that
he was willing to re-engage in services.

3. A DCS Case Manager Testifies

¶11 A DCS case manager had worked with the children since
November 2024. The case manager testified she believed Mother and L.R.’s
Father were “unable to discharge [their] parental responsibilities because of
[their] history with chronic [substance abuse],” the condition would
continue for an indeterminate period, and DCS “made reasonable and
diligent efforts to provide reunification services.” She stated that after
Mother complained the positive testing was an error, her manager
contacted the testing company which confirmed the test was accurate in
December 2024. She also testified that both children have been with DCS
placements for more than fifteen months and that both parents have been
“unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the child[ren] . . . to be in
an out-of-home placement.” She further stated she did not think Mother or
L.R.’s Father would be “capable of exercising proper and effective parental
care and control in the near future.” She testified termination was in the

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children’s best interests because it would allow them to be adopted and
provide permanency and stability.

D. The Juvenile Court Terminates Mother and L.R.’s Father’s
Parental Rights.

¶12 After the termination adjudication hearing, the juvenile court
terminated Mother and L.R.’s Father’s parental rights. The court found
DCS proved two grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) prolonged/chronic substance abuse, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3); and (2) out-of-
home placement for fifteen months, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). Moreover, it
found termination was in the children’s best interests because both children
are adoptable, their placements wish to adopt them, the children are
bonding with their placements, there was a lack of testimony of the
significant bond between the children and parents, the time both children
have spent with their placements is significant, it would provide for
permanency, the children are thriving with their placements, and the
placements are providing sibling visits.

¶13 Mother and L.R.’s Father timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 8-235, 12-120.21(A)(1), -
2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

The Juvenile Court Did Not Err By Terminating Mother and L.R.’s
Father’s Parental Rights.

¶14 A court may terminate parental rights where it finds: (1) clear
and convincing evidence of a ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B); and (2) a preponderance of the evidence shows termination is in the
child’s best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284 ¶ 22 (2005);
A.R.S. § 8-533(A)-(B). L.R.’s Father contends the court erred by finding DCS
proved the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.
Mother argues the court erred by finding termination in the children’s best
interests. We address each argument.

A. The Court Did Not Err By Finding DCS Had Proven
Termination Grounds as to L.R.’s Father by Clear and
Convincing Evidence.

¶15 Father contends the juvenile court erred by finding DCS
proved termination grounds by clear and convincing evidence. Here, the

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juvenile court found two grounds proven: chronic substance abuse and
fifteen months out-of-home placement. We see no error.

¶16 Section 8-533(B)(3) allows a court to terminate a parent-child
relationship if “the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities
because of . . . a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled
substances . . . and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” “Because
the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess
witness credibility,” we must accept its factual findings if they are
supported by “reasonable evidence and inferences.” Demetrius L. v.
Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3 ¶ 9 (2016). We will not affirm clearly erroneous
legal conclusions. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 479 ¶ 31
(2023); see also Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 580 ¶ 10 (2021).

¶17 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings.
The court first found L.R.’s Father had a history of chronic substance abuse
as: he admits using drugs since he was a teenager (about 10 years); his drug
tests have shown he has only been clean from fentanyl for a month; and he
is still using marijuana. The court next found he cannot discharge parental
responsibilities because he “has not demonstrated any times of being clean”
and “missed over a year of testing.” The court expressed concern he was
still using marijuana and did not “understand the affect substance abuse
can have on parenting.” The court then found there was a “reasonable
belief that chronic drug abuse will continue” because he is at most only one
month sober, “has not shown [he] participated in the necessary treatment
to help [him] stay sober,” and has a “history of relapsing.” The court also
found DCS “made reasonable efforts to reunify the family” as L.R.’s “Father
was offered services including, random urinalysis testing, a substance
abuse assessment and treatment, numerous [NPP] referrals and supervised
visitation through a case aide.”

¶18 Despite these detailed findings, L.R.’s Father argues DCS did
not prove this ground by clear and convincing evidence because he
“consistently participated in substance abuse treatment throughout the
case, albeit with varying results[;] . . . testified that he had been clean since
November 1, 2024[;] [a]nd evidence suggested [he] had the ability to
maintain his sobriety” because he had recovered from methamphetamine
addiction. He also points to his “successful visitations with his daughter.”

¶19 L.R.’s Father’s efforts to get clean are commendable. And the
juvenile court rightly acknowledged that he “consistently utilize[ed]
supervised visitation . . . [and] [t]here is no question the parents love the

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children.” But L.R.’s Father identifies no finding that lacks reasonable
evidence. The court was in the best position to weigh the evidence, so we
cannot say it erred by finding L.R.’s Father had a history of chronic
substance abuse and that DCS proved that ground for termination by clear
and convincing evidence. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3 ¶ 9. Because the
court did not err by finding the chronic substance abuse ground proven by
clear and convincing evidence, we need not evaluate its analysis of the out-
of-home placement ground.

B. The Court Did Not Err By Finding Termination of Mother’s
Parental Rights Was in the Children’s Best Interests.

¶20 Mother asserts the juvenile court erred by finding termination
was in the children's best interests. “[T]ermination is in the child’s best
interests if either: (1) the child will benefit from [the] severance; or (2) the
child will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 (2018). “[C]ourts must consider the totality of the
circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination.” Id. This
includes a child’s adoptability, Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217
Ariz. 585, 588 ¶ 11 (App. 2008), and a parent’s rehabilitation efforts, Alma
S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 15.

¶21 Mother contends the court made unsupported factual
findings, demonstrating it did not consider the totality of the circumstances.
See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13. We disagree.

¶22 First, she contends “the record did not support the juvenile
court’s finding that ‘I.[C.] has already suffered through one dependency
only to be returned home then removed 4 years later for the same reason’”
because “[n]o testimony or evidence supported a finding about I.C.
suffering during the previous dependency case.” But I.C. was declared
dependent four years before this case arose. The court noted the first
dependency to explain the children would benefit from termination
because it would provide permanency. The record supports the court’s
finding about the dependency. The court’s linkage between that fact and
the expected benefit of permanency was likewise not error.

¶23 Second, Mother asserts the “court improperly found ‘there
was not much testimony about a significant bond,’ and then focused only
on the bond between the child and their respective placements.” Further,
she contends the finding demonstrates the court “improperly ignored the
evidence admitted as exhibits.” The record supports a literal reading of the
court’s finding – almost no testimony was presented as to Mother’s bond

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with L.R. and I.C., which is illustrated by Mother’s lack of citations to
testimony contradicting this finding. The record supports Mother’s
contention that she has a strong bond with the children. But the testimony
and exhibits also show the children are bonded with their placements and
thriving. And the court explicitly noted it considered “the totality of the
circumstances, including [Mother’s] efforts toward reunification, the
parent-child bond, and fitness to parent.” There is no indication the court
improperly disregarded evidence of Mother’s bond with the children.
Instead, it appears the court weighed the evidence and found termination
in the children’s best interests. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 2 ¶ 2.

¶24 Third, Mother contends the court erred by failing to address
that I.C.’s placement was open to guardianship, termination would deprive
the children of visitation with Mother, and Mother had some level of
participation in all recommended services. But the court is not required to
make specific findings on all of the circumstances present at the time of
termination. It need only find that termination would benefit the child or
child would be harmed from a continued relationship. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at
150 ¶ 13. Here, the juvenile court found termination would benefit the
children because it would provide permanency and this finding is
supported by reasonable evidence including the children’s adoptability; the
children’s bonds with their placements, which they have been with for
years; and that the children are currently thriving in their placements’ care.
Thus, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s best interests
finding. See Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 583 ¶ 29.

CONCLUSION

¶25 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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